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THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS: THE EARLY YEARS
by JOSEPH R. GRODIN'
"Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on
those guaranteedby the United States Constitution."'
The proposition that the California Constitution is a source of
rights independent of the federal Constitution was not new in 1974,
when the state constitution was amended to make that proposition
explicit. Indeed, the framers of the state constitution would have been
astonished to learn otherwise. In 1849, when the delegates to the first
state constitutional convention adopted as the first article of their
enterprise a "Declaration of Rights," the United States Supreme
Court had already made clear, in Barron v. Baltimore,2 that the
federal Bill of Rights restricted only the national government, and did
not limit state authority. Article I, Section 10 of the federal
Constitution prohibited states from enacting certain laws, including
bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation
of contract, and the high court held that certain state regulations in
derogation of federal authority were impliedly prohibited, but
otherwise the original federal Constitution provided little or no
support for citizens claiming rights against their state. And while the
13th, 1 4th, and 15h Amendments to the federal Constitution clearly did
apply to the states, the high court in the Slaughter-House Cases3 held
only a few years after their adoption that they had only very limited
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1. Cal. Const. art. I, § 24
2. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).

3. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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scope, rendering them virtually meaningless outside the area of race
discrimination.
And so, in 1879 when the delegates to the second state
constitutional convention reiterated article I they, too, had to assume
that, except within that limited area, the rights of state citizens against
their government would be protected by the constitution they were
adopting, or not at all. Indeed, a proposal to add language declaring
the United States Constitution to be "the great charter of our
liberties" was met with denunciation and rejection: "We had state
charters before there was any Constitution of the United States"
observed one delegate; 4 "[T]he state constitution is as much or more
the charter of our liberties" declared another; reliance on the federal
Constitution as the principal author of liberties would be "a mistake
historically, a mistake in law, and it is a blunder all around."5 The
delegates contented themselves with a declaration that the "State of
California is an inseparable part of the Union,
6 and the United States
"
land.
the
of
law
supreme
the
is
Constitution
It was not until the new century and Lochner v. New York 7 that
the high court established the proposition that the Due Process
Clause of the 14 1h Amendment contained substantive protection
against deprivation of economic liberty, and the broader
incorporation of portions of the Bill of Rights into the 14th
Amendment came later, and only bit by bit.8 Meanwhile, with respect
to actions by state government, the state constitution was pretty much
the only game in town.
Article I of the California Constitution, "Declaration of Rights,"

was the first substantive item on the agenda of the 1849 constitutional
convention.
The original committee draft consisted of sixteen
sections, based upon or copied from the constitutions of two other

states, nine of them from New York's 1846 constitution and seven
4. E.B. WILLIS & P.K. STOCKTON, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 239 (1880)
Rolfe). Hereinafter DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS.

OF THE

(delegate

5. Id. at 238 (delegate Howard).
6. The 1879 language, modified to substitute "United States of America" for the
term "Union," appears now in article III, section 1.
7. 198 U.S. 45, 25 (1905). The holding in Lochner was presaged by dicta in Allgeyer
v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
8. In Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908) the high court acknowledged the
"possib[ility] that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments
against National action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of
them would be a denial of due process of law", but it was not until Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937) that the court set forth a theory of selective incorporation.
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from the Iowa Constitution of the same year.9 The committee draft
was modified in some respects, and supplemented by the addition of
two provisions. One of these affirmed the principle of popular
sovereignty: "All political power is inherent in the people.
Government is instituted for the protection, security, and benefit of
the people, and they have a right at all times, to alter or reform the
The other
same whenever the public good may require it."'"
incorporated natural law principles: "All men are by nature free and
independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are
those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing,
and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety and
happiness."'" This latter provision, amended by addition of the right
to "privacy," exists in the current state constitution as article I, section
1.12

The 1849 constitution provided for a supreme court consisting of
a chief justice and two associate justices, initially appointed by the
state legislature for staggered terms of two, four, and six years, and
thereafter elected for terms of six years. The first legislature elected
Serranus C. Hastings (who had been chief justice of the Iowa
Supreme Court, and was later to become the founder of Hastings
College of the Law) as chief justice, and Henry A. Lyons and
Nathaniel Bennett as associate justices. Lyons and Bennett were to
serve four and six years respectively, but both resigned after only two
years. 3 Indeed, the early period of the court was characterized by
considerable turnover in personnel. Of the total fifteen justices who
served from 1850 to 1862 (when the constitution was amended to
increase the number of justices from three to five), only one (Hugh C.
Murray) served out his term. Solmon Heydenfeld, (incidentally the
first Jewish member of the Court), came close, resigning after five
years. The others died or retired before their term expired.

9. For the background of the 1849 constitution, see GRODIN, MASSEY AND
CUNNGINGHAM, THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION, A REFERENCE GUIDE 3-9 (1993);
Christian Fritz, More Than Shreds and Patches: California's First Bill of Rights, 13
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 17 (1989).
10. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2.

11.

Id. at § 1.

12. Id.
13. According to J. EDWARD JOHNSON'S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES OF CALIFORNIA (1963), Bennett resigned pursuant to financial inducements
offered by a group of influential land owners who wanted him off the court in order to
make way for reversal of his decision in Woodworth v. Fulton, 1 Cal. 295 (1850). They
succeeded. See Stevens & Walker v. Stewart, 3 Cal. 140 (1853).
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The first group of justices was a diverse and rather colorful lot.
The most colorful by far was David Terry, who was elected to the
court as a candidate of the Know-Nothing Party in 1855, and became
chief justice in 1857. A pro-slavery southerner and a person of
volatile temperament, he left the court in 1859 after losing out to
Stephen Field for re-election as chief justice, and achieved infamy by
killing United States Senator David Broderick in a duel. Terry
himself was killed by Field's bodyguard on board a train, after Terry
allegedly attacked Field. Hugh C. Murray, elected to the court in 1851
and chief justice from 1852 to 1857, ran a close second to Terry in
volatility. Pro-slavery as well, he reportedly pulled a Bowie knife on
pro-abolitionist John C. Conness and chased him around a San
Francisco ballroom in 1853, and three years later assaulted a
Sacramento abolitionist with a heavy bludgeon.14
But Terry and Murray were good lawyers, and their eccentricities
were balanced by other justices with greater gravitas, including
Hastings and Hedenfeldt, as well as Peter Burnett (California's first
governor), Joseph Baldwin, and others. The best known of these less
flamboyant justices was Stephen J. Field, who served from 1858 to
1863 (the last four years as chief justice) before being appointed by
President Lincoln to the United States Supreme Court. Field, a
lawyer's lawyer, came to California in 1849, after practicing law in
New York with his famous brother, David Dudley Field, of Field
Code fame, and distinguished himself as an alcalde, a member of the
State Assembly, and principal author of California's civil and criminal
practice acts before his election to the supreme court in 1857.
In addition to the court's institutional instability, and the
occasional instability of some of its justices, the court's work reflected
an often rather casual attitude toward participation in decisions, and a
lack of strong commitment regarding precedent, or even consistency.
Often judgments would issue over the signature of only two justices,
with no accounting for the views of the third. And often the court
would depart from a prior holding without explanation, sometimes
with the barest of reference.
Even so, the opinions provide a fascinating window into a
turbulent time when the California justices found themselves on a
jurisprudential frontier that was as rough and tumultuous as the
controversies to which the opinions related. Required to make
14. Charles W. McCurdy, Prelude to Civil War: A Snaphot of the California Supreme
Court at Work in 1858, 1994 CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY
YEARBOOK 3-4 (1994).
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decisions with very little guidance, the justices received none from the
court in Washington, D.C. Moreover, underlying the legal issues the
justices were called upon to decide were controversies over
interpretive methodology and the role of the courts that are with us to
this day-issues such as the weight to be given constitutional language
compared to what the judges knew, or thought they knew, about the
intent of the framers; the role of precedent from other jurisdictions;
how to distinguish between the legitimate and illegitimate use of
legislative power; the distinction between finding and making law;
and the role of the judges' personal philosophies about governance
and society. The answers which the first California justices gave to
these questions, explicitly or (more often) implicitly, seem at this
distance in time and context often a bit naive, even opaque, and, it is
perhaps true that little is to be learned from the opinions themselves
concerning constitutional methodology that we do not already know.
But there is a freshness to their work, and a pragmatism, which serves
as a useful backdrop to what we like to think of as our more
sophisticated modern theories of constitutional analysis.
I.

Slavery and the Court

The delegates to the 1849 constitutional convention unanimously
approved a proposal by one of the delegates, William Shannon, to
prohibit slavery-a proposal which became article I, section 18 of the
new constitution." The motivation behind that proposal was as much
Shannon deplored slavery, but his
pragmatic as idealistic.
constituency, mainly miners in a mining district along the Yuba River,
deplored slave owners, not necessarily because they kept slaves, but
because they located claims in the names of their slaves. Moreover,
many delegates opposed slavery because they believed it would create
ruinous competition for free white laborers.16 Clearly the delegates
were not free from racism: a proposal to prohibit "free persons of
color from immigrating to and settling in the State" was approved by
the committee on article I, though it was defeated in the Committee
of the Whole, perhaps due to fear that the provision would
complicate California's admission as a state. 7
Despite the constitutional prohibition, the issue of slavery, and
the broader issue of North versus South, continued to divide
15. The provision is now contained in article I, section 6: "Slavery is prohibited.
Involuntary servitude is prohibited except to punish crime."
16. See Grodin, et. al. supra note 9, at 7-8.
17. Id.
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Californians. Indeed, from the time of California's admission as a
state in 1850 to the time of the Civil War the state was deeply divided
between pro-slavery and anti-slavery factions within the dominant
Democratic party, and during the early years the pro-slavery (or
"Chivalry") faction-except for the very quick emergence and decline
of the Know-Nothing party in 1855-was in control. Charles W.
McCurdy observes that every California congressman elected in the
mid-1850's grew up in a slave state, and of the seven justices who
served on the California Supreme Court between 1852 and 1857, all
but two came from the South, and one of these two-Alexander
Wells of New York City-had been a supporter of John C. Calhoun in
his 1844 bid for the presidency.18 The anti-slavery faction did not
achieve ascendance until just before the Civil War.
The slavery issue reached the court in relation to fugitive slaves.
In 1852 the State Legislature enacted a statute, patterned after the
federal Fugitive Slave Law, which provided that slaves who had been
voluntarily introduced into the state before the adoption of the
constitution, and who refused, upon the demand of their owner, to
return to the state where they "owed labor," should be deemed
fugitives and, upon petition by their owner, returned to the owner's
custody.19 Two former slaves, Carter and Robert Perkins, brought to
California by their master before adoption of the first state
constitution, had asserted their freedom, and for some months were
engaged in business themselves; but when the 1852 statute was
enacted they were arrested on the claim of the master. They
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus contending, among other
things, that the statute was invalid because of conflict with article I,
section 18. The supreme court, in opinions by Justices Murray and
Anderson, concluded otherwise, characterizing the provisions of
section 18 "directory only," requiring legislation for their
implementation.20
Six years later, however, in 1858, the court confronted another
fugitive slave case, and this time the court's response was a bit
different.21 Charles Stovall, who resided in Mississippi, came to

18. McCurdy, supra note 14, at 2.
19. CAL. CODE, chap. 33 (1852).
20. In re Carter Perkins and Robert Perkins, 2 Cal. 424 (1852). The Constitution was
amended in 1879, in reaction, to provide what is now article I, section 26: "The provisions
of this Constitution are mandatory or prohibitory, unless by express words they are
declared to be otherwise." See Oakland Paving Co. v. Hilton, 69 Cal. 479 (1886).
21. In re Archy, 9 Cal. 147 (1858).
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California in 1857-"for his health" he asserted, intending to return
within eighteen months-and brought with him Archy, a "family negro
servant" (otherwise described in the opinion as a slave) who was
nineteen years of age. Arriving in Sacramento, he hired Archy out
for "upwards of a month" while Stovall taught a private school. After
two months, Stovall placed Archy on a river steamer bound for San
Francisco, with the intention of sending him, in charge of an "agent,"
back to Mississippi, but Archy escaped from the boat. Stovall applied
to a justice of the peace for an arrest warrant, which was issued.
Archy was apprehended and held in the city prison of Sacramento,
but the local police chief declined to turn him over to Stovall, so
Stovall sought a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to the state Fugitive
Slave Law. Two justices of the supreme court considered the case:
David Terry (who had become chief justice) and Peter Burnett.
Stephen Field, appointed to the supreme court the previous year, was
on leave from the court, and out of the state at the time Archy's case
was decided. As frequently occurred during this period, the decision
was a two-justice opinion.
As described by Justice Burnett, the "case has excited much
interest and feeling, and gives rise to many questions of great delicacy
[not so much because of] the rights of the parties immediately
concerned in this particular case, as the bearing of the decision upon
our future relations with our sister States"'-meaning, of course, the
states in the South. After considerable and not altogether consistent
wandering through the thickets of precedent concerning the right of
slave-owning citizens to bring their slaves with them when traveling to
a state in which slavery is not permitted, Justice Burnett arrived at the
following principle: a "mere visitor [who] comes only for pleasure or
health, and who engages in no business while here, and remains only
for a reasonable time" is permitted to bring his personal attendant,
even if that be a slave, but "[i]f the party engages in any business
himself, or employ his slave in any business, except as mere personal
attendant upon himself, or family, then the character of visitor is lost,
and the slave is entitled to freedom." 24 And, said Justice Burnett, the
prohibition of slavery contained in article I, section 18 is selfexecuting, and requires no legislation for its implementation, Justice
22. 1858 was also the year in which a bill was introduced into the Assembly to
prohibit in-state immigration and residence for negroes and mulattoes. After a long bitter
fight, the bill never became law. Assembly Journal, 1858, 408, 462.
23. Archy, 9 Cal. at 162.
24. Id. at 168.
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Anderson's statement to the contrary in Perkins notwithstanding.
By this reasoning, Stovall should have lost his case-and would
have, said Justice Burnett, but for the circumstances and the
consideration that he presumably had some reason to believe, from
the opinions in Perkins, that the constitutional provision would have
no immediate operation. Declaring its intent to apply the rules
strictly in the future, Justice Burnett decided that the rule announced
in Archy's case should not apply to Archy, and that he should be
returned to his master. Chief Justice Terry concurred.
In anti-slavery circles, the court's opinion .was not well received.
San Francisco's Daily Alta California (which was owned at the time
by David Broderick) criticized Justice Burnett's opinion for "setting
forth a rule and then not follow it," and characterized it as a
"crowning absurdity and the greatest mass of legal contradictions that
has ever come under our notice."' 5 Both justices, the newspaper
proclaimed, "have not only disgraced themselves but have brought
odium on the state by this decision, and rendered the Supreme Bench
of California a laughing stock in the eyes of the world."26 Joseph G.
Baldwin, who succeeded Burnett on the court, sarcastically
summarized the case as holding that the constitution does not apply
to young men traveling for their health; that it does not apply for the
first time, and that the decisions of the supreme court are not to be
taken as precedents.2 ' Even Justice Field, who did not participate in
the decision, made known his disagreement with the court's ruling.
There was a surprising and gratifying (if somewhat confusing)
sequel to the case. Following the supreme court's decision, Archy,
after again escaping and being recaptured, was put on a boat to San
Francisco for transport back to Mississippi, but in San Francisco a
friend of Archy by the name of James Riker sought a second writ of
habeas corpus, this time for the release of Archy on the ground he
was a slave. That case came to be heard before a state judge in San
Francisco, but while it was pending Stovall invoked the jurisdiction of
a United States Commissioner (George Pen Johnson) on the ground
(inconsistent with Stovall's previous declarations) that Archy had
escaped from Mississippi, and at the request of Stovall's lawyers,
Archy was turned over to the custody of Commissioner Johnson. On
25.

DAILY ALTA CAL., Feb. 14, 1858, at 2.

26. Id.
27. JOHN S. HITrELL, A HISTORY OF THE CITY OF SAN
INCIDENTALLY OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 270-71 (1876).

28. SACRAMENTO DAILY UNION, Feb. 16, 1858, at 2.

FRANCISCO

AND
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April 14, 1858, Johnson decided that Archy was not a fugitive slave
after all, and discharged him from custody.29
II. Title Holders vs. Settlers
In addition to the slavery issue, California was split over a second
fault line, created by the huge influx of population following the
discovery of gold in 1850, and the uncertainty of land ownership,
particularly in the Sacramento Valley. Landowners who claimed title
through the old Mexican land grants came into collision with settlers
who, either oblivious to or in disregard of legal ownership, settled on
the land and built homes and other improvements. ° Battles between
these two groups reached the early California Legislature, which
enacted legislation tending to favor the settlers at the expense of the
title owners.
The most controversial piece of legislation was the Settler Law of
1856,31 which required the plaintiff in an ejectment action to pay the
defendant the value of improvement that the defendant had made to
the land. The constitutionality of that legislation came before the
supreme court in Billings v. Hall.2 The plaintiff, Billings, had
purchased certain lots in the city of Sacramento, originally owned by
John Sutter, and sought to eject the defendant, Hall, who was
occupying the land and had constructed certain improvements with a
value approximating the value of the land.33 Hall invoked a claim of
adverse possession and, in the alternative, the Settler Law of 1856. A
jury found for Hall on both defenses, and Billings appealed.34
The court at that time was comprised of Hugh C. Murray as chief
justice, and Peter Burnett and David Terry as associate justices. All
three justices agreed that the defendant was not entitled to adverse
possession, the time prescribed by statute not having run. The issue
dividing the court was the constitutionality of the Settler Law and on
that issue the court held, 2-1, with all three justices writing separately,

29.

DAILY ALTA CAL., Apr. 15, 1858, at 1; THEODORE H. HITrELL, HISTORY OF

CALIFORNIA, Vol. II 246 (1897).
30. The battle is described in Paul W. Gates, California's Embattled Settlers, 41
CALIFORNIA HISTORICAL SOCIETY 99 (1962).

31.
32.
33.
dollars
34.

1856 Cal. Stat. Chap. XLVII, §§ 4-5.
7 Cal. 1 (1857).
The case went to a jury, which found the value of the lots to be two thousand
and the value of the improvements nineteen hundred dollars. Id. at 2.
Id. at 1.
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that the law was unconstitutional.3 5
Chief Justice Murray's opinion, by far the most elaborate,
rejected plaintiff's contention that the Settler Act was law impairing
the obligations of contracts in violation of the federal Constitution,36
but concluded nevertheless that the Settler Act violated the state
constitution. His analysis began with article I, section 1, and its broad
statement of the right to acquire, possess, and protect property. The
chief justice declared:
This principle is as old as the Magna Carta. It lies at the
foundation of every constitutional government, and is necessary
to the existence of civil liberty and free institutions. It was not
lightly incorporated into the Constitution of this State as one of
those political dogmas designed to tickle the popular ear, and
conveying no substantial meaning or idea; but as one of those
fundamental principles of enlightened government, without a
rigorous observance of which there could be neither liberty nor
safety to the citizen.
If, then, one of the primary objects of government is to enable
the citizens to acquire, possess, and defend property, and this
right has been guaranteed by the Constitution, how can it be
impaired by legislation?37
The answer, it turned out, was that it could not, for:
[I]f a law which imposes upon a party, as a condition of the
recovery of his property, payment for the improvements which
were his already, or denies him the rents and profits of the land,
can be upheld, then an Act which divests the right entirely
could be maintained, as we see no difference in the principle
between taking a part and taking the whole.38
Justice Burnett's concurring opinion was in substantial
agreement, emphasizing the explicit incorporation into the state

35. Id.
36. Billings, 7 Cal. at 5-6 (stating:
We are not disposed to give much weight to this argument. We think it springs from a
misconception of the true relation that exists between the State and Federal governments;
that the State governments have the exclusive right to regulate their own internal or
domestic affairs, except when they have expressly parted with the power; that all questions
of property are within the jurisdiction of the respective States, and that the individual
members thereof, in forming a government are not to be considered as contractors with
the government thereby ordained, in the sense in which that term is employed in the
Constitution of the United States. It is but fair to suppose that individuals who sacrifice, or
part with, a portion of their natural rights for the common good of all, have just reason to
believe that the rights reserved will be respected or maintained inviolate, but this
agreement is a social compact, and not strictijuris a contract.)
37. Id. at 6.
38. Id. at 5-6.

Winter 2004] EARLY YEARS: STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

151

constitution of certain rights which had been recognized in the
tradition of natural law:
[F]or the Constitution to declare a right inalienable, and at the
same time leave the Legislature unlimited power over it, would
be a contradiction in terms, an idle provision, proving that a
Constitution was a mere parchment barrier, insufficient to
protect the citizen, delusive and visionary, and the practical
result of which would be to destroy, not conserve, the rights it
vainly presumed to protect.
Justice Terry dissented, rejecting the natural law position of the
majority and insisting upon the prerogatives of the legislative
Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution, he
branch. '
insisted, was: "a mere reiteration of a truism which is as old as
constitutional government. A similar declaration is contained in the
Constitutions of most of the States of the Union, but, I think, has
never been construed as a limitation on the power of the
government."' 1 In language echoing the opinions of today's "strict
constructionists," Justice Terry insisted that "[w]e cannot declare a
legislative act void because it conflicts with our opinion of policy,
expediency, or justice. We are not guardians of the rights of the
people of the State, unless they are secured by some42 constitutional
,
provision which comes within our judicial cognizance.
The Settler Act, Terry argued, reflects a policy on the part of the
legislature to encourage the settlement and cultivation of unoccupied
land, and in response to that policy many settlers made improvements
under the bona fide belief that the land settled upon was a portion of
the public domain. "Under these circumstances," he concluded,
we may well doubt whether it would be a greater violation of
natural justice to deprive hundreds of citizens and their families
of the homes erected by the labor of years, without making any
compensation for the improvements which constitute a great
part of the value of those homes, or to permit them to retain
the owner of the soil the full
possession of them upon paying to
value of all that is really his own. 43
39. Id. at 17.
40. Id. at 19 (Terry, J., dissenting).
41. Id. In this, Justice Terry happened to be wrong. See Joseph P. Grodin,
Rediscovering the State ConstitutionalRight to Happinessand Safety, 25 HASTINGS CONST.

L.Q. 1 (1997).
42. Billings, 7 Cal. at 21 (Terry, J., dissenting).
43. Billings, 7 Cal. at 26. In the same term, the court decided McCann v. Sierra
County, 7 Cal. 121 (1857), a brief and unanimous opinion holding that the state
constitutional requirement for just compensation upon a taking of property for public use
(then article I, section 8) meant that compensation must be paid prior to or at the time of
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lH. The Sunday Closing Law Cases: Newman and Andrews
It was in a constitutional case involving article I that Justices
Terry and Fields first disagreed in a published opinion. The case was
Ex Parte Newman," the year was 1858, and the issue was the validity
of a Sunday Closing Law which had been adopted earlier that year by
the state legislature. The statute, entitled "An Act to Provide for the
better observance of the Sabbath," made it a crime, punishable by $50
fine plus $20 for the costs of prosecution, to engage in business on a
Sunday.5
Earlier proposals for such a Sunday closing law had been
supported in the Legislature by arguments of a brazenly anti-semitic
nature 46 and the 1857 statute was challenged by a Jewish merchant,
the owner of a Sacramento clothing store, who was arrested after he
persisted in keeping his store open on Sundays. Newman's attorney,
Daniel Webster Welty, sought a writ of habeas corpus from the
California. Supreme Court and was joined in the briefs and the
argument by Solomon Heydenfeldt, who had resigned from the court
earlier that year.
Newman's lawyers argued that the statute was unconstitutional
on two grounds: that it constituted an interference with the right to
acquire property in violation of article I, section 1, and that it
constituted religious discrimination prohibited by article I, section 4,
which then provided:
[t]he free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall be forever
the taking, and could not be deferred. The most notable aspect of that case was that
Stephen Field argued the plaintiff's cause. He was soon to join the court.
44. 9 Cal. 502 (1858).
45. Id.
46. During a debate on the proposed statute on March 16, 1855, Speaker of the
Assembly William W. Stow of Santa Cruz declared that he had
no sympathy with the Jews, who ought to respect the laws and opinions of the
majority. They were a class of people who only came here to make money, and
leave as soon as they had effected their object. They did not invest their money in
the country or cities. They all intended and hoped to settle in their 'New
Jerusalem.'
He was in favor of inflicting "such a tax upon them as would act as a prohibition to their
residence among us. The Bible lay at the foundation of our institution, and its ordinances
ought to be covered and adhered to in legislating for the state." E.G. Buffum, an
Assemblyman from San Francisco, countered that the bill "would act more for the
protection of certain merchants of Santa Cruz and Santa Clara, who found their trade
interfered with, because the Jew[ish] merchants saw fit to open their shops on a Sunday."
13 OCCIDENT AND AM. JEWISH ADVOCATE 124 (1855), quoted in JEWISH VOICES OF
THE CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH 408 (Ava F. Kahn ed., 2002).
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allowed in this state.., the liberty of conscience hereby secured
shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or
justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this
state.

A majority of the court, consisting of Justice Terry (now chief
justice) and Justice Burnett, agreed with both arguments, making

California probably the first state in which a Sunday closing law was
struck down." Terry wrote the opinion, in which Justice Burnett
joined.
Terry was not prepared to accept a non-religious explanation for
the statute. He had
benefit of religion,"
observance of a day
entirely disregarded

no doubt that the law was intended "for the
and to "enforce, as a religious institution the
held sacred by the followers of one faith, and
by all the other denominations within the

State."49 It was, therefore, in violation of article I, section 4, which in
Terry's view was meant not merely to guarantee ''toleration," but to
assure "a complete separation between Church and State, and a
perfect equality without distinction between all religious sects." 0

Terry went on to argue that even if viewed as a "civil regulation"
the statute was invalid under article I, section 1, because "without
necessity, it infringes upon the liberty of the citizen, by restraining his
right to acquire property."51 The argument is straight out of John
Locke, and leads in the direction of Lochner: 2 "men have a natural

right to do anything which their inclinations may suggest, if it be not
47. CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 4 (amended 1879). The 1879 constitution expanded the
separation of church and state in California by adding broad language (now contained in
article XVI, section 5), prohibiting public aid to religion or religious institutions and
banning state aid to sectarian schools (now article IX, section 8). Article I, section 4 was
itself strengthened by the 1879 constitution to substitute "guaranteed" for the word
"allowed." The present language of section 4, which prohibits any law "respecting an
establishment of religion," was added in 1974.
48. Sunday closing laws were widespread in the early decades of the nineteenth
century (see Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of
the NonestablishmentPrinciple,27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 1104 (1985)), and in the early cases
were candidly accepted as a proper exercise of state power to further religious objectives
(E.g., Commonwealth v. Wolf, 3 Serg. & Rawle 48 (Pa. 1817) (stressing the need to remind
the populace "of their religious duties at stated periods.")). By the time Newman was
decided, state courts had backed away from the religious justification for Sunday closing
laws, but were upholding them as reasonable civil regulations of the workweek (see
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), and id. at 470-473 (Frankfurter, J., separate
opinion)). Newman was an aberration.
49. Newman, 9 Cal. at 505.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 510.
52. 198 U.S. at 45.
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others. '' "3

evil in itself, and in no way impairs the rights of
The
legislature may restrain individual conduct so as to protect others
"from every species of danger to person, health, and property," but
this statute could not be justified on those grounds:
Now, when we come to inquire what reason can be given for the
claim of power to enact a Sunday law, we are told, looking at it
in its purely civil aspect, that it is absolutely necessary for the
benefit of his [sic] health and the restoration of his [sic] powers,
and in aid of this great social necessity, the Legislature may, for
the general convenience, set apart a particular day of rest, and
require its observance by all.
This argument is founded on the assumption that mankind are
in the habit of working too much, and thereby entailing evil
upon society, and that without compulsion they will not seek
the necessary repose which their exhausted natures demand.
This is to us a new theory, and is contradicted by the history of
the past and the observations of the present. We have heard, in
all ages, of declamations and reproaches against the vice of
indolence, but we have yet to learn that there has ever been any
general complaint of an intemperate, vicious, unhealthy, or
morbid industry.
As well might the Legislature fix the days and hours of work,
and enforce their observance by an unbending rule which shall
be visited alike upon the weak and strong. Whenever such
attempts are made, the law-making power leaves its legitimate
sphere, and makes an incursion in the realms of physiology, and
its enactments, like the sumptuary laws of the ancients, which
prescribe the mode and texture of people's clothing, or similar
laws which might prescribe and limit our food and drink, must
be regarded as an invasion, without reason or necessity, of the
natural rights of 4 the citizen, which are guaranteed by the
fundamental law.1
The inconsistency between Terry's defense of judicial activism
based on natural justice principles and judicial activism in Newman
and his earlier rejection of those principles in Billings was of course
obvious to all participants. Indeed, the state Attorney General, in
oral argument, quoted extensively from Terry's opinion in Billings, to
which Terry responded, "[t]hat was not the opinion of the Court,"5
and in his Newman opinion he defended the switch by bowing humbly
to precedent, stating "the doctrine announced in Billings, having
received the sanction of the majority of the Court, has become the

53. Id.
54. Newman, 9 Cal. at 508-09.
55. SACRAMENTO DAILY UNION, June 22, 1858, at 5.
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rule of decision, and it is the duty of the Court to see it is uniformly
enforced, and that its application is not confined to a particular class
of cases."
Justice Field, in dissent, complained in now familiar terms that
the opinions of his colleagues "appear to me to assert a power in the
judiciary never contemplated by the Constitution. 5 6 As to section 4,
Field insisted it was improper to delve into the motives of the
legislature.57 Since the law on its face did not allude to the subject of
religious profession or worship, it was appropriate to consider it as
establishing a rule of civil conduct "founded in experience and
sustained by science," and in any event immune from judicial
interference as:
[t]he Legislature possesses the undoubted right to pass laws for
the preservation of health and the promotion of good morals,
and if it is of opinion that periodical cessation from labor will
tend to both, and thinks proper to carry its opinion into a
statutory enactment on the subject, there is no power, outside
of its constituents, which can sit in judgment upon its action. 8
It was "no answer," Justice Field insisted, to say that people do
not need protection against over-work, and he reasoned:
The relations of superior and subordinate, master and servant,
principal and clerk, always have and always will exist. Labor is
in a great degree dependent upon capital, and unless the
exercise of the power which capital affords is restrained, those
who are obliged to labor will not possess the freedom for rest
which they would otherwise exercise... It is idle to talk of a
man's freedom to rest when his wife and children are looking to
his daily labor for their daily support 9
The authority of Ex Parte Newman was of brief duration. Three
years later, in 1861, the legislature again enacted a Sunday closing
law, virtually identical to the one declared unconstitutional in
Newman. By that time the composition of the court had changed;
Justices Burnett and Terry had left, replaced by Justices Baldwin and
Cope,' and Field was now chief justice. Perhaps the legislature
56. Newman, 9 Cal. at 518 (Field, J., dissenting).
57.

Id.

58. Id. at 520.
59. Id.
60. In 1858, the composition of the court was the focus of the ongoing battle between
landowners, who favored title, and the miners and settlers, who favored possession. The
miners and settlers favored Burnett and opposed Baldwin, whom they saw as a friend of
the landowners, but Baldwin won despite their opposition, taking his seat on the court
October 2, 1858. The court then consisted of Baldwin, Terry, and Field. Terry left the
court in the fall of 1858, one year short of the end of his term, after he failed to obtain the
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anticipated that a differently composed supreme court would come to
a different conclusion, and if so they were right. With only an allusion
to Newman, and without explicitly overruling it, the court upheld the
law.61
Justice Baldwin's opinion, joined by both other justices,
dismissed article I, section 1 in language that might have been used by
Justice Holmes in his Lochner dissent, or by the United States
Supreme Court in the late 1930's. 62 Observing that the right of
"acquiring property" does not deprive the legislature of the "power of
prescribing the mode of acquisition or of regulating the conduct and
relations of the members of the society in respect to property rights,"
the opinion declared that the legislature may "repress whatever is
hurtful to the general good," and that the legislature "must generally
be the exclusive judge of what is or is not hurtful including 'moral' as
well as 'physical' harms." The legislature might have believed that
the law provides "indirectly protection against oppression to
employees, women, apprentices and servants," and the court held:
These are considerations for the lawgiver and do not come
within our province. We merely allude to them to show that the
Legislature may consider and give effect to them; for it is
impossible for us to see why that department may not protect
and regulate labor and the relations of the different members of
society so that one class may not injure a dependent class-the
master the apprentice-the husband the wife-the parent the
child-or why, if it be the interest of the whole society that no
nomination for chief justice from the Lecompton (pro-slavery) wing of the Democratic
Party, and Cope was nominated in his place. In the course of the battle, Terry spoke
harshly of the Anti-Lecompton (pro-abolitionist) group, and his remarks led David
Broderick to announce that while he had "hitherto spoken of [Terry] as an honest man-as
the only honest man on the bench of a miserable, corrupt Supreme Court-but now I find I
was mistaken. He is just as bad as the others." This response led to the famous duel
between Terry and Broderick. A. RUSSELL- BUCHANAN, DAVID S. TERRY OF
CALIFORNIA: DUELING JUDGE, 95-110 (1956); DAVID A. WILLIAMS, DAVID C.
BRODERICK: A POLITICAL PORTRAIT, 230-231 (1969). The history is summarized in
PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN FIELD: SHAPING LIBERTY FROM THE GOLD RUSH TO
THE GILDED AGE 86 (1997).

Joseph G. Baldwin had practiced law in Mississippi and Alabama for nearly twenty years,
served in the Alabama legislature, and acquired some renown as an author of literature
before coming to California in 1854. On the court, he had a reputation for being second
only to Field in ability. Arnold Roth, The California State Supreme Court, 1860-1879: A
Legal History 18 (1973) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California). Warner
W. Cope, who succeeded Terry and became chief Justice when Field left the court, served
until 1864, and thereafter, remaining active in the practice of law, became one of the
original trustees of Hastings College of the Law. Id.
61. Exparte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678,682 (1861).
62. Id.
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labor not necessary should be done on a given day, it may not
prohibit it on that day."

As to article I, section 4, the Andrews court observed that the
statute "requires no man to profess or support any school or system
of religious faith, or even to have any religion at all; it does not
require him to contribute money to any sect, or to attend any church
or meeting," and "does not discriminate in favor of any sect, system,
or school in the matter of their religion." 64 The title of the statute
("For the Observance of the Sabbath") does not establish a religious
motive on the part of the legislature, and so long as the law is aimed
at secular interests, that it may also "promote piety" is no objection.65
The opinion refers the reader to Justice Field's dissent in Newman for
further enlightenment.'
IV. Early Approaches to the Requirement for Uniformity
The 1849 Constitution contained a requirement, in article 1,
section 11, that "all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform
operation," and a requirement in article XI, section 13 that "taxation
shall be equal and uniform throughout the State." From the outset,
the California Supreme Court read both these provisions with
considerable deference to legislative judgment.
Article XI, section 13 came before the court in People v. Naglee,67
involving the validity under both federal and state constitutions of a
statute requiring "foreigners" to procure a license for the privilege of
mining. The court upheld the statute against all challenges, finding
article XI, section 13 inapplicable on the ground that it applied only
to a "direct tax on property. 68
Several years later, in People v. Coleman69 the court reached the
same conclusion, rejecting an article XI, section 13 challenge to the
1853 Revenue Act, which imposed a tax of 60 cents on every 100
dollars worth of goods brought into the state from any other state or
foreign country, and sold in California. Instead of simply relying
upon Naglee for that proposition, however, the court embarked upon

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 683.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 684.
1 Cal. 232 (1850).
Id.
4 Cal. 46, 50 (1854).
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an inquiry into the legislative history of the constitutional language"
and upon its pre-1849 interpretation by the courts of New York, from
which the language was derived. The court said:
It is a safe rule of construction that, when framing the organic
law of this State, the Convention thought proper to borrow
provisions from the Constitutions of other States, which
provisions had already received a judicial construction, they
adopted the provisions in view of such construction and
acquiesced in their construction."
The court in Coleman also rejected a claim that the Revenue Act
violated the requirement for uniformity contained in article I, section
11, responding:
[t]he idea of a revenue law which is equal in its operation, is
entirely Utopian, and never can be realized. If the Legislature
should pass an act designedly operating unequally, or if a want
of uniformity in its operation was apparent on its face, it would
be the duty of this Court to interpose, and prevent the
commission of so grave an injustice.... But if, in trying to
approximate to a correct standard, the law may work a hardship
in particular supposed cases, it would rather be a consideration
for the Legislature than an argument for the Courts.72
The criterion implied by the court's analysis is one of good faith
on the part of the legislative branch.
In subsequent cases, the court rendered article I, section 11
virtually meaningless by insisting that it applied only to "general"
laws and not to "special" laws. This rather reductionist reasoning led
the court in Smith v. Judge of the Twelfth District3 to uphold an act of
the legislature which changed the venue for the trial of one Homer
Smith for the murder of Samuel T. Newell from San Francisco, where
the murder occurred, to Auburn where, according to the legislative

70. As initially proposed, the language referred to "all lands liable to taxation." This
was amended first to substitute "immovable and movable property" for the word "lands"
and then to read "all property," and providing for the election of Assessors in each
County. The court's opinion asserts that "in adopting this provision as a substitute the
Convention seems to have supposed that it applied to lands only." This inference is
(rather weakly) supported by a general observation that "the expediency of placing any
limitation or restraint upon the taxing power of the Legislature was strongly doubted, and
the clause only adopted as a pledge of security to the native inhabitants, against imaginary
cases of inequality or arbitrary exactions," and (perhaps more strongly) by statements
which were made by the delegate, Mr. Gwin, who proposed the final language. He
referred to having copied the provision from the Constitution of Texas, and referred to
assessors being residents of the country or district "in which the lands are situated." Id.
71. Coleman, 4 Cal. at 50.
72. Id. at 56.
73. 17 Cal. 547 (1861).
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findings, both the accused and the deceased and most of the relevant
witnesses resided. The trial court in San Francisco declined to comply
with the legislature's directive, considering it a violation of both the
requirement for uniformity of legislation and the prerogatives of the
judiciary. 4 The supreme court, in an opinion by Justice Baldwin,
rejected both arguments; the first on the ground that the law was
"special" and therefore not subject to the requirements of article I,
section 11, and the second on the (rather disingenuous) reasoning that
while the legislature could not dictate to a court how to decide a
particular case, it could, and did, enact a law which the court
was
76
bound to follow. 75 Justice Field concurred only in the judgment.
Smith, and subsequent decisions following its distinction between
general and special laws77 led to a provision in the constitution of 1879
limiting "special legislation." 78

Meanwhile the court had occasion to consider an 1861 statute
which amended the statute upheld in Naglee to provide that "all

foreigners not eligible to become citizens of the United States [read
"Chinese"] residing in any mining district in this State, shall be
considered miners under the provisions of this Act."7 9 In other words,

Chinese living in a mining district were to pay the tax whether miners
or not. Ah Pong was unquestionably not a miner but a washerman;
but, under the terms of the statute the tax was imposed, and Ah Pong,
being unable to pay, was conscripted to work on the public roads a
sufficient number of days to exhaust the sum due.' When he refused,
and was sent to jail, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with
the supreme court."

74. Id.
75. It was "absurd" Justice Baldwin added, to think that the rules of Criminal Practice
could apply to all alleged criminals alike, "for different classes of crimes may and do call
for different rules of procedure, and so might different classes of criminals, as Chinamen,
etc." Smith, 17 Cal. at 547.
76. Id.
77. E.g., Brooks v. Hyde, 37 Cal. 366 (1869).
78. Article IV, section 25 of the 1879 Constitution provided that the legislature shall
not pass "local or special laws" in thirty-two enumerated areas, and "in all other cases
where a general law can be made applicable." California courts came to rely upon that
provision, in conjunction with article I, section 11, as establishing an equal protection
principle similar to that developed under the 14" Amendment. E.g. Britton v. Bd. of
Comm'rs, 129 Cal. 337 (1900).
79. Ex Parte Ah Pong, 19 Cal. 106 (1861) (discussing section 97 of the Revenue Act of
1861).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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Though 1861 was the year the court decided Andrews and Smith,
both containing broad declarations of deference to legislative
judgment, the court in Ah Pong's case granted the writ, apparently
holding the statute unconstitutional, though on what ground is not
clear. In a cryptic one-sentence opinion, Justice Baldwin, for a
unanimous court (which included Justices Field and Cope) declared :
"If the Act is to be construed as imposing this tax, it cannot be
supported, any more than could a law be sustained which imposed
upon every man residing in a given section of the State a license as a
merchant, whatever his occupation. '"" From a modern perspective
the case looks like an early application of substantive due process, or
perhaps the conclusive presumption branch of procedural due
process, but Justice Baldwin found no need to refer to any
constitutional provision in support of the court's holding. Perhaps it
was Stephen Field's bid for a seat on the United States Supreme
Court, or perhaps it presaged a broader scope for the equal
protection principle which the court had previously rejected.
Conclusion
Most of what the California Supreme Court had to say during the
pre-Civil War period about rights under the state constitution is no
longer of substantive interest. Slavery ceased to be an issue after the
war; battles over the power of the legislature to define property rights
have (for the most part) moved beyond debates over natural rights;
the kinds of constitutional questions raised by Sunday closing laws
have become subject to more sophisticated (if not more helpful)
analysis; and the arguments over the meaning of the "uniformity"
requirement in the 1849 constitution have been rendered largely moot
by subsequent constitutional changes.
The contemporary significance of the early opinions, apart from
their colorful eccentricities, lies in their power to remind us of the
meaning of state constitutional independence during a period in
which the federal Bill of Rights was still awaiting judicial
development. As the years went by, the situation changed. The
adoption of the

13

,

,
14 h

and

15 h Amendments

after the Civil War,

'h
the U.S. Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of the
Amendment's Due Process Clause in Lochner, and the Court's
subsequent utilization of the Due Process Clause as a vehicle for
applying against states the protections which citizens have under most
1 4

82. Ah Pong, 19 Cal. at 108.
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of the Bill of Rights-all of this dramatically altered the relationship
between states and the federal government in the arena of
constitutional rights. None of these changes deprived the states of the
power of their own constitutions to protect rights independently of
the federal Constitution; they merely established a floor of federal
protection. Nonetheless, as the high court began to ascribe meaning
to federally protected rights, state courts, including the California
Supreme Court, began to rely increasingly on federal constitutional
analysis, and to relegate state constitutional rights to a secondary,
almost forgotten, position.
The 1970's brought a revival of interest in state constitutions,
marked in California by the 1974 declaration, in article I, section 24,
of the independence of state constitutional rights; and in recent years
the California Supreme Court has come to take state constitutional
claims, and its obligation to examine them independently, more
seriously. In performing that obligation, however, the court has at
times displayed what I would characterize as inappropriate modesty,
both by relying upon the federal Constitution without considering the
state constitution, and by deferring unnecessarily to federal
constitutional interpretation as a starting point for interpreting like
language in the state constitution. The modesty is inappropriate, I
would argue, both as a matter of theory and as a matter of
practicality, but those arguments must await a further article, focusing
upon the current court and its state constitutional jurisprudence.
Meanwhile, the early history of the California court and its treatment
of state constitutional claims provide useful insight into the historical
meaning of state constitutional independence.
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